

Democratic Decentralisation through a Natural Resource Lens: An Introduction

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I. INTRODUCTION

Decentralisations have taken place around the world over the past century [Ribot, 1999]. Since the mid-1980s, however, decentralisation has become a truly global movement, affecting most developing countries [UNCDF, 2000: 5–11; World Bank, 2000; Totemeyer, 2000; Dillinger, 1994; Therkildsen, 1993; Fisher, 1991]. Governments have decentralised for multiple political–economic, social and ideological reasons, and often with the support and pressure of aid agencies [Ribot, 2002b]. At least 60 countries now claim to be decentralising some aspect of natural resource management [Agrawal, 2001]. The language of decentralisation has changed in this most recent set of reforms [Ribot, forthcoming]. Earlier reforms emphasised national cohesion, effective rule and the efficient management of rural subjects [Buell, 1928; Mair, 1936; Mamdani, 1996]. In contrast, the most recent decentralisations are introducing a new emancipatory language of democracy, pluralism and rights. Wollenberg, Edmunds and Anderson [2001], Anderson, Clement and Crowder [1998], Alden Wily [2000a, b], Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan [2000] and Utting [1999]

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point out that natural resource management is moving toward more democratic and rights-based premises.¹ Indeed, most countries are labelling their decentralisations 'democratic'.

While a mix of factors and forces shape decentralisation, most decentralisation theorists and policy makers argue that reforms are done for developmentalist reasons. They justify decentralisation reforms on the grounds that the increased efficiency, equity and inclusion that should arise from decentralisation result in better and more sustainable management [*Smoke, 2000; Manor, 1999; Crook and Manor, 1998; Mawhood, 1983; Uphoff and Esman, 1974; UNDP, 1999*]. Some focus on its political and economic advantages, arguing that decentralisation plays important roles in the following: democratisation and people's participation [*Crook and Manor, 1998; Ribot, 1996; Mbassi, 1995: 23; Rothchild, 1994: 1*]; rural development [*Uphoff and Esman, 1974: xx; UNDP, 1999; Helmsing, 2001; Roe, 1995: 833; De Valk, 1990; Ribot, 2002b*]; public service performance [*World Bank, 2000: 107*]; poverty alleviation [*Crook and Sverrisson, 2001: iii*]; relief of fiscal crisis [*Olowu, 2001; Menizen-Dick and Knox, 1999: 5*]; political and macroeconomic stability [*World Bank, 2000: 107; Prud'homme, 2001: 14*]; national unity and state building [*Conyers, 2000: 7; Mamdani, 1996; Bazaara, 2002, 2003; Muhereza 2003*]; and helping to increase the legitimacy of government [*Ribot, 2002a, b*].

Is this tidal wave of decentralisation discourse being legislated into appropriate laws and implemented in practice? What are its effects on the ground? This volume queries the state and effect of this movement through the lens of natural resource decentralisations. The contributions in this special issue use a comparative framework to characterise the degree to which natural resource decentralisations can be said to be taking place and, where possible, to measure their social and environmental consequences. The contributions, except for that of Meynen and Doornbos, which came to our attention later, are a subset of the papers presented at the 'Workshop on Decentralization and the Environment', held in Bellagio, Italy, 18–22 February, 2002.² The purpose of this workshop was to consolidate the findings of research on decentralisation and natural resources from around the world.

This volume includes case studies from Africa (Cameroon and South Africa), Asia (Indonesia, Mongolia, China and India) and Latin America (Nicaragua, Brazil and Bolivia), which address the management of water, land, forests or pasture. In addition to the particular theoretical or practical concerns of each author, the comparative framework guiding the case studies focuses attention on 1) the extent to which central governments have decentralised authority over natural resources to local governments or other sub-national entities, 2) the relations between these local-level entities and the population, and 3) the effects of these processes on local peoples and natural resources

[see Ribot, 2001]. This introductory essay also draws on other cases presented at Bellagio and those available in the broader literature.

Actors, Powers and Accountability: An Analytic Starting Point

By definition, decentralisation involves the transfer of power from the central government to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy [Mawhood, 1983; Smith, 1985; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999]. The mechanism through which theorists believe that efficiency and equity should increase is by public decisions being brought closer and made more open and accountable to local populations [Oyogi, 2000; Smoke, 2000; Manor, 1999; Mawhood, 1983].³ For this to happen, several authors argue that some form of downwardly accountable local representation is necessary [Ribot, 1995; Smoke, 2000; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999]. Through broad-based local input and influence, decentralisation brings local knowledge into the decision-making process, which should result in better-targeted policies and reduced information and transaction costs [World Bank, 1997]. Other authors argue that local participation in decision making makes people more likely to have a sense of 'ownership' of those decisions [see Ostrom, 1990; Hirschman, 2003], such as rules for resource use. Because of this 'ownership' ostensibly they will provide better information and be more engaged in implementing, monitoring and enforcing such rules. In addition, marginalised groups could have greater influence on local policies because of the open nature of decision-making, thus increasing equity. [Smoke, 2000; Carney, 1995; Kaimowitz et al., 1998; Margulis, 1999; Ostrom, 1990.]

The transfer of power from central to local authorities has taken administrative and political forms. Administrative decentralisation, or deconcentration, of public services – transfers of power to local administrative bodies – aims to help line ministries, such as health, education, public works and environment, to read the preferences of local populations and to better mobilise local resources and labour. Political or democratic decentralisation integrates local populations into decision-making through better representation by creating and empowering representative local governments. Democratic decentralisation is premised on new local institutions 1) being representative of and accountable to local populations and 2) having a secure and autonomous domain of powers to make and implement meaningful decisions [Ribot, 2002b].

Deconcentration is a weaker form of decentralisation than is democratic decentralisation since the mechanisms by which deconcentrated decision-makers are responsive and accountable to local populations are weaker [Ribot, 2002a]. If efficiency and equity benefits arise from the democratic processes which encourage local authorities to serve the needs and desires of their constituents [Smoke, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001], then democratic

decentralisation should be the most effective form of decentralisation. With regard to natural resources, however, democratic decentralisation has proven difficult to find, and the results of existing policies are highly varied.

The actors, powers and accountability framework [Agrawal and Ribot, 1999] provides an important tool for analysing the type and extent of decentralisation in a specific country. In particular, it considers 1) the powers, and accompanying resources, actually transferred to lower-level actors to determine whether an autonomous domain of decision making actually exists around issues of local significance; and 2) the local-level entities receiving powers and their relation to the population in order to understand the extent to which these are both representative of and downwardly accountable to local peoples.

This volume, however, illustrates that the type and extent of decentralisation is not the only relevant factor in understanding how local actors will use their new powers or what outcomes these will have for local people and resources. The way in which decentralisation is implemented as well as the economic context associated with each particular natural resource, for example, also affect the kinds of choices that are made by local decision makers. Central governments can also make an important difference through their overall commitment to implementation, local capacity building and social equity for marginal actors. Grass roots and donor pressures for change strongly influence central government commitment or resistance to decentralisation. At the local level, at least four factors affect decision-making: the overall capacity of the decision-making body, local power relations, the incentive structure for resource management, and environmental and social ideology [Larson, 2003a; see also Larson, 2002].

Natural Resources: A Lens on Decentralisation Dynamics

The contributions in this volume interrogate decentralisation through the lens of natural resources, which the contributors have found to be a sharp optic for insights into decentralisation writ large – not just into natural resource management and use [Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002]. This optic is particularly powerful since natural resources differ from other sectors in ways that augment and throw into relief decentralisation's potential and risks as a lever for local democratisation and development. Natural resources are at once critical for local livelihoods (subsistence and income generation) and are also the basis of significant wealth for governments and national elites. As such they have historically been a point of struggle between rural people and these elites.

With decentralisation, natural resource transfer is a great opportunity for increasing the relevance of local authorities to local people, yet it is simultaneously a threat to central authorities and elites who fear loss of income or patronage resources. For example, there has been considerable political

conflict and resistance associated with the redistribution of power and resources that, by definition, accompanies decentralisation [see Larson, Ntsebeza, Cousins and Kepe, all this volume; Peluso, 2002; Ribot and Oyono, forthcoming]. Nevertheless, given their local importance and historical local uses and claims, local knowledge and input are highly relevant to their management – making them good candidates for decentralised management and use. The evidence from these and other essays, however, shows that threats to national-level interests are producing resistance which is fettering the struggle for reform.

Some Central Problems in Decentralisation – or Decentralising Problems?

Several observations concerning decentralisations that involve natural resources emerge from essays in this volume. First, the democratic decentralisation of natural resource management is *barely happening*. All of the case studies in this issue highlight problems with – or central government resistance to – power transfers to local entities and/or problems with the downward accountability of the local entities receiving powers [see Bazaara, 2002; Kassibo, 2002; Peluso, 2002]. Second, democratic decentralisation of natural resources appears to be more fully developed where local people and/or local governments have had at least partial success in *mobilising to demand greater authority* [see Larson, Oyono, Pacheco, Resosudarmo, Meynen and Doornbos, Baviskar, all this volume; see also Kassibo, 2002]. Third, the essays all demonstrate that the outcomes of these partial, blocked and hybrid decentralisations are *highly varied*, both among and within countries, and the cases begin to explain some of the reasons for those differences [see Ribot, 2001].

Greater local participation in decision making or, at the very least, a better understanding of local needs and desires and the incorporation of these into government programs, are key aspects of decentralisation theory [Ribot, 1996; Crook and Manor, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999]. Yet, just as decentralisation in practice is not always what central governments and donors purport it to be, this volume also brings into question the claims of ‘participation’ [see also Mosse, 2001; Hirschmann, 2003]. This volume shows that ‘participation’ – whether through elected authorities, co-management, committee-based management, or ‘traditional’ authorities – usually looks like a modern reproduction of indirect rule (that is, a means for managing labour and resources) [Ribot, 1995, forthcoming]. It does not reflect the enfranchisement that participation and decentralisation discourses – through empowered downwardly accountable representation – promise. Resosudarmo [2002] has astutely labelled some of these new co-management arrangements ‘co-administration’: a form of deconcentration where elected local authorities are used by central government and donors as local administrators to implement outside agendas.⁴ Participatory processes, however, can also

be positive, particularly as an instrument for identifying and including poor and marginalised people in decision-making [*Mansuri and Rao, 2003; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003*]. Participatory methods, then, can be important tools for enhancing the inclusiveness of democratic processes. Given their limits and proneness to abuse, though, participatory methods should not be used in ways that compete with or substitute for nascent democratic processes.

Downward accountability of leaders to citizens is the substantive essence of democracy [*Moore, 1998*]. It is the mechanism by which decentralisations are supposed to secure participation, even when representative, elected local governments tend to have a poor record in terms of serving women, the poor and other marginalised populations – unless required to do so by central government [*Crook and Sverrisson, 2001*]. Nevertheless, elected local authorities appear to be the most systematic means of broad-based inclusion. However, the essays in this volume indicate concerted resistance even to establishing this basic level of local democracy. Central governments are choosing upwardly accountable institutions to receive decentralised powers or responsibilities as part of their strategy to maintain central control over natural resources [*Ribot, 2003*]. In the names of ‘pluralism’ and ‘civil society’, development institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) appear to be choosing to transfer powers to less-than-democratic ‘traditional’ authorities, committees and local NGOs, either due to a naive populism, an uncritical acceptance of everything ‘indigenous’, or an anti-government stance inherited from the Thatcher revolution [*Ribot and Oyono, forthcoming*].⁵ The convergence of these anti-democratic tendencies is causing a potentially destructive proliferation of local institutions [*see Ntsebeza, Manor, both this volume; Namara and Nsabagasani, 2003*], which – in turn – is creating competition with fledgling local democratic institutions and undermining their powers and legitimacy. This dynamic also appears to be fragmenting local identities – away from residency-based citizenship and identification with local government as a positive force and toward more divisive ethnic- and lineage-based forms of belonging [*Geschiere, 2003, forthcoming; Ribot, forthcoming*].

Yet, downward accountability of local authority is not the only accountability relation that matters. Central government must be downwardly accountable to local elected authorities for effective decentralisations. Local governments need services from central government – such as expertise, heavy machinery, financial support and market access. Central government also has responsibility for clarifying laws, mediating major disputes, and providing guidelines and means to assure the inclusion of marginal groups. There must be mechanisms for local representatives to hold higher-level bureaucrats accountable to them [*Ntsebeza, this volume; Xu and Ribot, this volume*]. Xu and Ribot [*this volume*] imply that in China local authorities cannot achieve

downward accountability of higher-level government since the only level of democratic government is the most local; these elected authorities have little leverage over higher-level authorities. Holding the state accountable means having a real counter power in the local arena – indeed, accountability itself can be defined as counter power [see *Agrawal and Ribot, 1999*]. It may mean having democratic institutions at higher levels (whether this is at intermediate levels of decentralised authority or in state and national legislatures [see *Veit, forthcoming*]) – and there does appear to be a need for multiple channels of influence over the state. It also means local governments must be sufficiently strong, politically organised and federated, and backed by real popular demand for their political and technical functions. Local popular demand for decentralisation must also be enabled and fostered [see, in this volume, *Larson; Oyono; Pacheco; Resosudarmo; Meynen and Doornbos*].

Furthermore, for the state to play a supportive role, central government also needs to be strong [see, in this volume, *Cousins and Kepe; Meynen and Doornbos; Resosudarmo; see also Ribot, 2002b*]. Although the downsizing of government – through structural-adjustment policies – has often led to decentralisation policies, there is no contradiction between a strong state and decentralisation. Decentralisation should strengthen both central and local government. It is not about dismantling the state in order to replace it with local democratic sovereigns. It is about creating local democracy that can build legitimate states and governments – writ large – by playing the inclusive and democratic role that many of us hope governments can play and which are the foundation of democratic systems. Decentralisation is about bringing the state back in, but this time as a positive and legitimate democratic institution.

Decentralisations are not working as some theories suggest. The essays in this volume illustrate that this ‘failure’ is partly because of the fact that decentralisations are not being implemented, but is also due to the factors that democratic decentralisation theories cannot or do not account for. Most decentralisation theory stems from a mix of new institutionalist ‘if-then’ propositions: if the institutions (that is, actors, powers and accountability) are right, then the outcomes will be positive. We cannot yet say whether these ‘if-then’ propositions are right, because, for many reasons, decentralisations are not getting to ‘if’ [see *Ribot, forthcoming*]. The failure to establish decentralisations – the failure to get to ‘if’ – is partly due to the practical complexities of implementation, to factors external to the models, to the multiple and alternative motives behind power transfers to the periphery when they do happen,⁶ and to the larger political economy in which attempts at these institutional changes are embedded [see *Larson, 2003b*]. When factors outside of the models dominate outcomes, it is time to rethink those models or to systematically locate them in a broader political economy [see *Cousins in Latif, 2002*].⁷

The degree of decentralisation and its outcomes are shaped by many factors: local capacities; incentive structures; ideologies; political and social histories; forms of local social organisation; degrees of local stratification; unresolved land and forest tenure relations; failure to account for time and insecurities (and often retrenching) produced by change; the strength and manipulations of elite actors; state and government resistance; and government, NGO and development agency commitment to 'traditional' or private and third-sector institutions over democratic authorities. Moreover, decentralisations are often implemented with the primarily instrumental goals of intervening agencies, such as improving environmental management, pacifying local opposition or meeting donor demands, rather than as a complex, integral political project. Unfortunately, the commitment to democratisation and popular participation may be minimal or secondary. Whether it is due to practical difficulties of reform, government resistance strategies or the naive populism of development agents and NGOs, non-implementation takes several forms and can still be, at least partly, measured against the models that are used to justify these reforms. Models help us to recognise decentralisation when we see it: we know they are not being implemented because governments transfer inadequate *powers* to *actors* who are not *accountable* to local populations.

II. THE ESSAYS IN THIS VOLUME

Each essay in this volume is discussed below with an eye to highlighting the newest insights.

Amita Baviskar's essay throws into relief the often-seen chasm between decentralisation discourse and practice. In Baviskar's case study of Madyha Pradesh, India, the chasm is produced by the contradiction between procedural participatory objectives of decentralisation and the instrumental objectives of donor programs [see also *Shivaramkrishnan, 2000*]. Donors pre-specify the objectives that local people are supposed to adopt as their own – 'participate in' – while creating incentives for project managers to achieve these objectives through specific success indicators. In Baviskar's case, this development formula made a watershed management project into a theatre where successful participation and ecological improvement were performed for the donor audience. The performance was enabled by separating participation from power – that is, by using or creating representative structures but locating real decision making elsewhere. In this case, structures of representation and participation are well crafted, but project decisions are made by project personnel who must perform successfully and are accountable to their bosses to demonstrate success through overly specified indicators of preconceived outcomes.

Baviskar shows the process by which donor-required success is manufactured, how the local elite and project managers participate and benefit, and how the ecology and well being of the population remains unchanged. To avoid delays and the 'politics' of the *panchayat* (elected local government), the administrators, in collaboration with local elite farmers, circumvent the committees and the inconvenience of local democracy [see also *Ferguson, 1994*], avoiding the 'politics' that are the heart of democratic decentralisation [see also *Manor, this volume*]. In short, Baviskar points out that project and funding imperatives and the incentives they create for administrators can lead projects to undermine the very processes they purport to be supporting [see also *Mosse, 2001; Hirschmann, 2003; Vivian and Maseko, 1994; Kassibo, 2002*]. The need to identify such 'successes' subverts any real attempt at building longer-term, locally rooted and locally accountable institutional processes.

Ben Cousins' and Thembele Kepe's contribution describes a 'decentralised' natural resource management initiative in South Africa's Wild Coast that also purports, but fails, to promote local participation and empowerment. In spite of its accompanying rhetoric, the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) in Mkambati fails to establish the kind of decentralisation that would make local participation possible. Instead of working through democratic local authorities, decision-making powers remain centralised or are given to elite actors unaccountable to local people. Democratic participation is minimal, hence the local realities of resource use never enter the decision-making processes, and local institutions that frame resource access, rights and conflicts are marginalised. The case reflects how the disenfranchising of people through the disabling of democratic processes disenfranchises their local experience, knowledge and institutions. As the authors argue, prospects for development interventions to integrate successfully with the lived realities of local peoples would be significantly enhanced if they were based on locally accountable institutions that effectively represent local understanding, needs and aspirations [see also *Oyono, this volume*].

The Mkambati case also illustrates the destructive confusion that arises when privatisation is done in the name of decentralisation [see also *Johnson and Forsyth, 2002*]. Privatisation is not decentralisation – its accolades are attributed to its exclusive logic rather than the inclusive logic that is behind the efficiency and equity benefits of decentralisation [Ribot, 2002b]. The two are often conflated since decentralisation and privatisation are both possible routes to state downsizing. Yet decentralisation is about strengthening local government – something that these and other authors point out is also enhanced by the presence of a strong and dedicated central state [see also *Meynen and Doornbos, this volume; Xu and Ribot, this volume; Ribot, 2002b*]. While privatisation is an option for powers pried from central governments

under dominant and widespread neo-liberal economic policy – including structural adjustments – it is not the only option.

In the Makambati case, privatisation through ‘outsourcing’ facilitated elite capture by providing ‘opportunities for opportunists’. Prospects for local democratic institutions to contribute to development were further undermined as local political and business elites harnessed development committees (set up for popular ‘empowerment’) for personal accumulation [*see also, in this volume, Manor; Baviskar; Oyono*]. Furthermore, this privatisation was undertaken in a context of deep social conflict, and both privatisation and elite capture were met with disputes and resistance – undermining the project itself. Without local input into decisions and the fair resolution of deep-seated land-tenure disputes, for example, projects like the SDI in Mkambati are doomed. Strong central intervention may be needed to apply new decentralisation laws and help clarify conflictual land-tenure arrangements.

Anne Larson’s essay encourages us to explore the ways in which decentralisation is leveraged from below. Definitions of decentralisation usually refer explicitly only to the formal, legal process of power and resource redistribution as designed and implemented by central governments. As we see in many of the cases in this volume, central governments resist institutionalising the formal structures necessary for local participation and democracy to flourish. Larson argues from the Nicaraguan experience that formal decentralisation needs grass-roots demand to overcome central resistance [*see also, in this volume, Baviskar; Meynen and Doornbos*]. In Nicaragua, as the formal structures have been put in place, local capacity to make demands has increased, the political power and legitimacy of local governments has grown, and central leaders have begun to see political advantages in making local government allies – which makes them more amenable to furthering the formal process, and so on. Larson refers to the local dynamic – whereby local leaders make decisions, with or without formal decentralised authority, in a context of increasing local legitimacy – as decentralisation ‘from below’.

Moreover, Larson argues that natural resources are particularly amenable to decentralisation from below, at least in part because they are already physically located in the local arena, and within a particular history and tradition of everyday resource use and management [*see also Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002*]. Local leaders, however, may be more likely to ignore natural resources and concentrate on the service and infrastructure investments that many consider to be their top development priority, or they may only be interested in resource exploitation as an economic opportunity. Like central governments, though, local governments respond to grass-roots pressure from constituents [*see also Brannstrom, this volume; Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003; Larson and Ferroukhi, 2003*], who increasingly turn to their local elected officials to address

resource-related problems and conflicts. Effective and responsible decentralised natural resource management will arise, therefore, from a dynamic process involving decentralisation not only from above but also from below. Decentralisation reforms from above create the infrastructure of participation by broadening opportunities for people to influence government. Decentralisation from below is when people use that infrastructure along with other channels of political leverage to seize and realise the new opportunities.

However, demand cannot come from below when people are subject to arbitrary authority. Lungisile Ntsebeza's essay is about tension between 'traditional' chiefs and local democracy where contradictory laws recognise both. Due to their historical relevance to local populations, traditional leadership is often celebrated as being a more legitimate or appropriate recipient of decentralised land decisions than are elected local authorities [*see also, for example, Oyono, this volume*]. But conflicts over a new system of land administration in post-apartheid South Africa illustrate that some chiefs are not downwardly accountable. Drawing on Mamdani [1996], Ntsebeza argues that rural residents who are dependent on hereditary traditional leadership are not citizens, but subjects. Though some traditional leaders promote local participation, leaders who cannot be selected – or removed – by constituents have only limited downward accountability. Ntsebeza argues that democracy should be both participatory and representative, and that rural citizenship requires that the South African government return to its commitment to create and support democratically elected local governments.

Ntsebeza's South African case also highlights the importance of central government accountability to local authorities and the complexities of transition. Ntsebeza shows that higher-level governments must also be accountable to lower level elected authorities [*see also Xu and Ribot, this volume*]. Local government needs the support of central government to carry out its functions and to gain local people's confidence. In Transkei, rural South Africa, central government administrators failed to even acknowledge local government in their constitutionally sanctioned role in land allocation and integrated rural planning. The failure of elected local government to perform this role undermined the authority of local representatives and forced local residents to turn back to tribal authorities for access to basic resources – although many residents would have preferred to work with their elected authorities. Because central authorities do not support new local governments, apartheid-era laws remain in force. Furthermore, the failure to resolve conflicting authority over land has led to a breakdown of old resource management systems – also largely under the authority of traditional leaders – without the clear establishment of new ones. The resulting state of confusion and insecurity leads to an absence of rules and an 'open access' problem for natural resources. Similar concerns affect Mongolia and Indonesia [*see Mearns, this volume; Resosudarmo, this volume*].

Pablo Pacheco's contribution provides a detailed study of Bolivia, where significant forest management responsibilities have been decentralised to local governments. It shows that local governments have been given powers to allocate forest resources to local populations, and central authorities have provided these local authorities with technical support. In contrast, most of the outcomes observed in the essays presented in this volume are often not the outcomes of democratic decentralisation but rather of hybrids, deconcentration, privatisation, or partial, poorly designed or highly circumscribed decentralisation. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to indicate that, under the right circumstances, the theory can hold true: democratic decentralisation can improve efficiency, equity, democracy and resource management [see also *Ferroukhi, 2003; Larson, 2003a; Ribot, 2002a, forthcoming*].

Bolivia's decentralisation, although more advanced than others in Latin America, is, however, only partial. Though some powers are being transferred in Bolivia, like other cases in this volume, local-government decision making, and access to and control of benefits from the forestry sector, is still limited and circumscribed by government controls. Furthermore, despite authorities being elected locally, downward accountability remains highly problematic [see also *Resosudarmo, this volume*]. Pacheco points out that the structure of elections – particularly party involvement – does not foster downward accountability [see also *Ribot, 1996, 1999, 2002b; Larson and Ferroukhi, 2003*]. Outcomes associated with Bolivia's decentralisation are highly diverse – both positive and negative for local populations and for the forest. Pacheco finds that whether outcomes improve the lot of marginal people or reinforce asymmetries of local power relations in favour of the elite depends on the degree to which authorities are accountable to local constituents. The involvement of elected authorities in forest management is a function of the degree of local livelihood dependence on the resource.

Ida Adu Pradnja Resosudarmo and Robin Mearns describe decentralisations in Indonesia and Mongolia that cannot be understood in isolation from other sweeping national reforms occurring simultaneously. The rapid transition from strong, authoritarian central government to more decentralised, democratic structures has led to what is – hopefully – a temporary breakdown of each nation's natural resource management systems. In the midst of the crisis of change, the rules of natural resource governance are highly vulnerable to insecurity, particularly where resources are valuable – as in Indonesia – or under common property management – as in Mongolia. In Indonesia, where central authority included violent repression, decentralisation has mirrored central behaviour, fostering violence [see also *Peluso, 2002*].

Resosudarmo's contribution highlights the importance of the historical context for understanding the response of local governments and citizens to new opportunities such as those offered by decentralisation. In Indonesia, 30 years

of authoritarian central government ended in political and economic crisis in the late 1990s. Citizens in the Outer Islands in particular deeply resented years of marginalisation and, above all, ongoing exclusion from the lucrative timber trade. When political reforms finally began, local governments scrambled to find new sources of income to assert their political autonomy from central government. Logging contracts became one of those sources, leading to the proliferation of small-scale contracts. In the reforms, central government transferred to lower-level governments the rights to a significant portion of the income and the power to allocate harvesting and use in areas of up to 100 hectares of highly lucrative forest resources. The result has been a substantial increase in logging with little regard for environmental consequences, as local people and governments take advantage of a new income-generating opportunity. Resosudarmo attributes over-exploitation to insecurity and a lack of confidence that these new local rights will last – especially since central authorities have already tried to re-concentrate some of these powers.

Resosudarmo, moreover, also shows that local authorities have only limited downward accountability to the population, since the popular vote is restricted to the election of a political party list rather than individual candidates chosen locally – as is true in most developing countries; this is a major problem for decentralisations [*see also Pacheco, this volume*].⁸ While local people have benefited to some degree from new access to forest resources, the primary benefits have not gone to those who need them most. The Indonesia case highlights the importance of downward accountability as well as the need for a balance of powers between central and local authorities in periods of decentralisation. It highlights the danger of decentralisation that happens too fast and with almost no central-government supervision and the dangers of reactionary re-centralisation threats that increase insecurity.

Mearns' contribution illustrates similar problems in Mongolia. At present, decentralisation in Mongolia's pasture management is structured as deconcentration, as the local authorities being given management powers are not elected but rather appointed by the central government; elected local authorities have little power and almost no fiscal resources. In the case of Mongolia, ambiguous authority and power transfers make it unclear which rules take precedence in determining who grazes where and when. As a result, it is increasingly common for the herders themselves to make unilateral decisions. While the passage of time – which should lead to the gradual consolidation of new institutions – may be an important part of the solution to these problems, Mongolia's pastures could benefit from greater transparency and downward accountability of those with resource-management powers – including public participation in land management decisions and greater clarity in terms of the definition and use of those powers.

Furthermore, Mearns argues that for pastoralists in Mongolia, incomplete or 'empty' decentralisation has increased social differentiation and vulnerability, and led to an 'open-access' crisis of the commons. Transfer of responsibilities to local levels of government constituted a withdrawal of the state, rather than decentralisation. Without the devolution of fiscal resources or means for holding local authorities accountable, Mongolia's post-socialist transition produced increased need – in the form of unemployed urban labourers who returned to the countryside to herd – and a provision vacuum – in the form of unfinanced and unaccountable local government. This effective disengagement of the central state resulted in: increased vulnerability for pastoralists; increased social vulnerability as the newer, less-experienced and least socially connected herders failed and dropped out of herding; and the reconfiguration of grazing patterns with profound consequences for the pastoral environment. Poorer herders remained close to settlements, which led to overstocking, while vast more-distant areas remained underused due to the lack of investment in water supply, transport infrastructure and service provision – all resulting from the fiscal constraints on local government.

Jianchu Xu and Jesse Ribot's essay shows how the provincial government of Yunnan, China undermines its tentative moves toward decentralised forest management by continuing to allow powerful central policy makers to implement far-reaching decisions that affect peoples' livelihoods without any local participation or accountability. The provincial government's fairly weak decentralisation efforts are completely overshadowed by drastic top-down measures that have severely undermined local livelihoods by limiting economic alternatives in the interest of protecting forests and watersheds. These higher-level authorities have failed to account for livelihood needs in their conservation-oriented decisions. The essay implies that because the democratic part of decentralisation involves only the lowest level of political administration – the 'administrative village', there are no democratic mechanisms in place to hold higher-level government offices downwardly accountable to the local elected administrative village heads or to the local population. Because of this, decentralisation remains limited. The essay also suggests that this downward accountability of higher-level authorities will be essential to establishing effective democratic decentralisation and bringing indigenous people's livelihood concerns into decisions [*see also Ntsebeza, this volume; Cousins and Kepe, this volume*].

Phil René Oyono's contribution emphasises the sociological context of decentralisation initiatives, arguing that decentralisation does not lead to automatic benefits but must be implemented in such a way that reinforces democratic practices and social responsibility. Even where systems are established for elected committees with local leaders to receive important decision-making powers, as in Cameroon, the results may not benefit either

local peoples or the forest. Rather, in spite of committee elections, some local leaders do not represent local peoples' interests but rather are establishing themselves as a new local elite, as we have seen in several cases. Not all communities are able to demand or enforce the downward accountability of their leaders. In contrast with Nstebeza's contribution discussed above, Oyono argues that the failure of this new local leadership is partly related to the marginalisation of traditional leaders, who have greater legitimacy but have been left out of this process. In addition, many local villagers – as well as these new forestry committees – believe it is time to get their 'fair share' from the forest, and support rapid and extensive logging to increase local revenues. This is in part because of the history of forest centralisation and elite exploitation in Cameroon and because decentralisation has been implemented as an administrative procedure with purely instrumental managerial interests rather than as a value-laden package for good governance and resource management in the common interest.

James Manor's contribution outlines a major shift in the local institutional basis of the current decentralisation movement. The first wave of the current movement, in the 1980s, transferred powers to multi-purpose (hence integrative) local governments. In recent years, however, international donors and central governments are increasingly turning toward single-purpose user committees. Manor argues that donors see user committees as a mechanism to give local peoples greater say over the development decisions that affect them. Central government officials, however, establish user committees at the insistence of donors but then manipulate them to their own ends by limiting their downward accountability – through the selection of committee members – and by reigning in their powers and jurisdiction [*see also Baviskar, this volume*].

While Manor argues that these committees are less democratically accountable and less representative than local government, they are often justified in the name of keeping politics out of what are purported to be 'scientific' or 'technical' decisions [*see also Baviskar, this volume; Ferguson, 1994*]. Yet, as Manor (and Baviskar [*this volume*]) makes evident, keeping politics out of decision making is far from the central government's intention – which is simply to maintain its own hegemony. Besides, politics is not to be avoided – as it could be – as an inconvenience; rather, it should be embraced as the mechanism by which local preferences and needs are registered, integrated and responded to.

Manor's contribution emphasises how these proliferating single-purpose committees are undermining the democratic processes that were presumably institutionalised with the creation and strengthening of elected local governments in Third World countries.⁹ Grass-roots participation is fragmented, reducing its coherence and effectiveness, and the poor may even

be worse off than before. Fundamentally, these user committees, which tend to be 'over-funded' when compared to under-funded, elected, multi-purpose local government bodies, generate confusion over the division of responsibilities, usurp local-government functions and deprive local governments of revenues [see also Ribot, 2002b]. These myriad problems result in destructive conflicts and the undermining of local-government authority. Ironically, governments, donors and NGOs – in the name of participation and democracy – are undermining democracy through the naivety of their actions, their failure to recognise the eminently political nature of decentralisation, and, in some cases, their effort to destroy local democratic processes. Manor suggests that the solution is to place local committees under the authority of elected local governments [see also Ribot and Oyono, forthcoming; Blair, 2000].

Christian Brannstrom's essay focuses on larger-scale, single-purpose watershed management committees that encompass multiple local jurisdictions (what Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynn [1993] call 'special districts'). Territories of elected political institutions are rarely contiguous with larger ecologically defined watershed or forest zones. Their jurisdiction is often too small for the scale on which these resources require management. As such, integrated management of these resources poses a challenge for decentralisation. Usually, these larger-scale resource zones are managed by technical ministries of the central state. Some countries, such as Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua, are approaching decentralised management of such resources by creating federations or consortiums of local governments [Larson, 2003c; Pacheco, 2003; Vallejo, 2003]. In other places, new jurisdictions are created with elected authorities in order to govern such specially defined ecological districts [Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynn, 1993].

In Brazil, other alternatives have been tried. Brannstrom compares three different committee-based approaches to watershed resource management in the three Brazilian states. In spite of the presence of local governments (as a minority of members) on two of the regional (catchment-scale) committees, the author argues that all three cases represent decentralisation largely to upwardly accountable actors. Unlike Manor, who argues that elected local governments are critical for user-committee accountability and democracy, Brannstrom argues that only in the state that mandated the inclusion of *civil society* representatives on the water resources committee was there a degree of downward accountability. He presents evidence that civil society groups exerted significant pressure on other members to be downwardly accountable and played an important role in opening debate on controversial water issues and in organising water user groups. Obviously, the civil society and local government approaches are not mutually exclusive. Brannstrom also points out that local governments tend to demand short-term political returns on their

decisions, whereas other groups may have longer-term horizons. Brannstrom emphasises that decentralisation is most productive when the state creates new ways to pry open government to multiple influences and to find ways for local government and civil society to work together.

Brannstrom's essay also indicates some important limits to civil society approaches. In the case where civil society organisations were committee members, there were no organisations representing shantytown dwellers or water consumers. The government did, however, organise small farmers into associations to include them in decision making – indicating that central government can play a role in assuring broad-based inclusion, especially of marginal segments of the population [see also Crook and Sverrisson, 2003]. Brannstrom makes the further point that although NGOs may be able to hold government accountable, it remains unclear what or whom these NGOs represent [see also Manor, *this volume*; Ribot, 2002a]. In addition, Brannstrom points out that the committee in São Paulo became the focus for grass-roots activists, 'who previously would have lobbied individual municipal governments or bureaucratic headquarters'. This is another illustration of Manor's [*this volume*] point that these committees take powers and relevance away from elected local governments [see also Ribot, 2002a, b, *forthcoming*]. Inclusion of 'civil society' institutions in public decision making can certainly be a positive force – but it probably does not hurt to keep it in check via dependence on representative authorities [Manor, *this volume*; Blair, 2000].

Wicky Meynen and Martin Doornbos's essay articulates the often unstated conceptual differences and policy objectives regarding decentralisation and natural resource governance, which often give rise to conflicting institutional arrangements that are not compatible with democratic decentralisation or sustainable resource management. In particular, the authors argue that the same donor agencies often promote, on the one hand, market liberalisation and privatisation of natural resources for commercial exploitation and decentralisation, and on the other hand, popular participation and community-based approaches to enhance subsistence strategies. While it is not clear that donor agencies in fact view local participation through decentralisation as limited to defending subsistence interests, this essay elucidates the problems that can arise when different priorities, power struggles and inaccurate conceptions of 'the local' result in a mixture of contradictory policies at the national level and conflicting institutional arrangements locally.

Drawing on examples from India in particular, Meynen and Doornbos demonstrate the following responses to decentralisation: active state opposition to devolving power and resources; conflicting relations among state agencies, local user groups and local elected officials; intra-village conflicts over new boundaries; and selective privatisation and other forms of exclusion that discriminate against marginal groups. While similar problems are apparent

in many of the essays, this essay is particularly useful because of the way in which the authors link these institutional outcomes to unresolved conceptual contradictions. For effective democratic decentralisation, the authors highlight the importance of a strong central state [*see also Cousins and Kepe, this volume*], particularly for redressing inequalities and resolving conflicting or exclusionary natural resource management initiatives, and flexible implementation in order to address diverse local realities. Fundamentally, however, they argue that decentralisation will continue to be fraught with contradictions unless there is organised and effective civil society pressure combined with countervailing global forces that would fundamentally reverse current priorities.

III. WAYS FORWARD/RESEARCH AGENDA

The first step forward from the current impasses would be to implement the decentralisation experiment. This might involve identifying the appropriate powers to transfer (and those to keep central) and building the kinds of representative, locally accountable institutions that make decentralisation effective. It would involve opening *public* dialogues with governments, development institutions, NGOs and local communities on which powers should be public and which private, and which central and which local [*see Larson, 2003b, 2003d*]. It would involve public dialogue on the implications of the mix and hierarchy of local institutions that governments, development agencies and NGOs are choosing to work with and on the constitution of representation in the local arena. Promoting local enfranchisement through decentralisation will also involve thinking through the timing and sequencing of reforms to reduce uncertainties and the shocks of change, and giving the experiment time to take root. Decentralisation should, if established, also create multiple channels of influence that grass-roots movements and individuals can use to discipline the authorities who wield power over them; such influence is a key part of the production of citizenship. Yet citizens also need civic education to know that they have channels of influence, and they also must learn to exercise the powers that are available. Testing democratic decentralisation will most certainly also involve developing effective strategies for avoiding elite capture and for countering government resistance to dialogue and change at every turn.

Baviskar's contribution to this issue indicates three arenas in which the link between the people and the state can be opened. First, strong grass-roots organisation, particularly of subaltern groups, is imperative to overcome central government resistance to democratic decentralisation. Where local people are unable or unwilling to make demands on state administrators or even on their own elected committee members or local governments, they

become collaborators in the charade of decentralisation – even more so when they participate in corruption, help manufacture the charade of success and/or benefit economically from it. Second, she suggests the importance of understanding the complex history of relations between the state and local populations in order to understand the furthering of such collaboration. Third, she points out the need for researchers and other third parties to take a closer look at decentralisation processes and publicise their findings as another important accountability mechanism. Research has an important role to play in identifying positive alternatives and in ‘raking the muck’ to force governments and development agencies to act according to their promises.

Further research will help us to clarify where decentralisations are falling short, where they are moving forward to produce positive outcomes and how we can leverage productive change.¹⁰ Some research needs to focus on seemingly technical matters. For example, better subsidiarity principles are needed to guide the choice of powers – to identify which should remain public, which can serve society best when privatised, and to indicate which belong at each level of the political-administrative hierarchy. Such research could then feed into the public dialogues mentioned above. Institutional choices also require guidelines and public debate. More research is needed on the implications of local institutional proliferation, inter-institutional relations, arrangements of nesting and hierarchy, and mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability. More must be understood also about the scale of institutions and how to match larger ecological scales of management to political-administrative districts without undermining fledgling local democratic institutions. Additional work is also needed on how ‘rights-based’ approaches [see *Johnson and Forsyth, 2002*] and minimum-standards approaches (also about establishing a domain of local freedoms) [*Ribot, 2002b, forthcoming*] can enhance the domain of discretion, the powers, the effectiveness and ultimately the legitimacy of local democratic authorities.

As Martin Luther King [1963] said, ‘freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed’. Further research is needed to understand how local people come to demand representation and services. To what degree is local mobilisation a matter of producing empowered and representative local authorities that people feel they have a reason to influence, and to what degree is it about civic education, political organising or even rebel rousing? How do people become engaged as citizens rather than managed as subjects? Of course, while technical criteria can be produced to guide decentralisations, ultimately decentralisations are always political and therefore require public engagement and debate. That debate can be effectively informed by good research on the many factors that appear to shape the establishment of decentralisation and its outcomes. It can also be informed by research on the views of local people, which are often excluded

from public debate. Research can shed light on the local legitimacy of different government and non-government regimes, on the preferences and desires of local people and on the structures that exclude these perspectives from public discourse.

Finally, we need to use what we are learning to produce new theories, models and analytic approaches that can help us locate the micro- and macro-structures of decentralisation in a larger political economy of state formation, governmentality, popular movements, resistance and counter resistance. The stumping out of fledgling democratic institutions prescribed by democracy theorists and democratic decentralisation advocates alike is a political problem. It is no wonder that democratic decentralisation as a political solution is threatening many actors and facing widespread resistance.

NOTES

1. It is important to note that the language of rights and enfranchisement was also present in earlier decentralisations. So, this is not a complete change, but rather democratisation and rights issues emerge more frequently in this round [see Mair, 1936]. It should be taken as a cautionary note that the earlier decentralisations, which went under such titles as 'indirect rule', were not emancipatory reforms [Ribot, 1999].
2. The minutes for this meeting can be found on the World Resources Institute website at <http://www.wri.org>. See Latif [2002].
3. According to the World Bank, decentralisation should improve resource allocation, efficiency, accountability and equity 'by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely' [World Bank, 1988]. Local governments are in a better position to know the needs and desires of their constituents than national governments, while at the same time it is easier for constituents to hold local leaders accountable [World Bank, 2000]. Decentralisations are also expected to promote democracy by 'bringing the state closer to the people', increasing local participation and building social capital [World Bank, 1997].
4. Similarly, the use of uncompensated local labour in the name of participation is another common practice; Ribot [1995] called this practice 'participatory corvée'.
5. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that there are some very real concerns about the accountability as well as capacity of more 'democratic' structures, such as local elected governments. We believe, however, that the short-term gains that may be made by circumventing them only serve to undermine democratic processes in the long term. It is also important to recognise that traditionally marginalised populations, such as indigenous groups, peasants and women, will probably need direct interventions in their favour in order for their livelihoods to improve, whichever type of decentralisation is implemented. See Edmunds and Wollenberg [2003].
6. When real power transfers take place to the periphery, it is usually due to economic crisis, political crisis, successionist movements or conditionalities from international donors. In exceptional cases, as in Kerala State in India, it has occurred due to ideological commitment to decentralisation and popular participation [see Ribot, 2002b]. Bazaara [2002] and Muhereza [2003] have argued that decentralisation in Uganda, which is publicly justified on the grounds of efficiency, equity and democracy, is actually about the resolution of fiscal and political crises.
7. As Cooper [1993: 89] commented, if the 'model treats the most important problems as exogenous factors to be invoked to explain why things do not work out correctly, perhaps the model and exogenous factors should change places'. Yet, it is important when making such changes not to throw out what the models have to offer. We may be able to keep the 'if-then' propositions while querying the problems of getting to 'if'.

8. For notable exceptions, see the cases of Mali and Uganda [Kassibo, 2002; Bazaara, 2002, 2003].
9. In a WRI-organised workshop on 'Decentralization and the Environment' held in Cape Town in March 2001, Agrappinah Namara and Dr. Nyangabyaki Bazaara presented arguments on what they called 'the committee effect' in Uganda. They noted the proliferation of committees and many of its negative effects – including the creation of a professional class of committee members.
10. For an extensive research agenda on democratic decentralisation, see Ribot [2002b].

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